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abstract
This paper discusses the intellectual justification of scientometrics through the claim that it is part of the
quest for a quantitative science of science. Initially, I will make a brief description of scientometrics’ his-
torical background. Next, I will explain that those disciplines that have been satisfactorily mathematized
always contain two distinct basic components: an axiomatic, defining the operations that can be realized
with the available data, and an interpretation of their meaning. Counting papers and citations is a way to
collect statistical data about scientific activities, and therefore the axiomatic basis of scientometrics comes
from statistics. Regarding the interpretation of scientometrics, I will argue that the meanings attributed
to their key concepts are usually borrowed from economics. Then I discuss how the promise of a science
of science becomes a too well adjusted historical narrative that apparently justifies the economic con-
cerns of governments and private corporations.
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The significance of science and technology for economic development is currently taken
for granted as an indisputable premise of any science policy. A wide range of authors
from the nineteenth century already had emphasized the connections between sci-
ence, technology, and economy, but it was mainly after 1940 that scientific and tech-
nological activities began to be systematically accounted by those governments that
considered them indispensable requisites for competitive economies. Contemporary
quantitative studies on scientific and technological activities make up the field gener-
ally called scientometrics, which includes a wide variety of subjects encompassing at least
four subtypes: “science and technology indicators, information systems on science and
technology, the interaction between science and technology, and cognitive as well as
socio-organizational structures in science and technology” (Raan, 1997, p. 205). In
fact, there is no sharp limit between scientometrics and other empirical studies on
science and technology, but it is intuitively recognized that scientometrics primarily
aims to measure science. The name of the discipline intends to express such idea.
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1 The promise of a science of science
The polymath Francis Galton actually made the very first surveys on the number of men
of science in England (cf. Godin, 2007a). This initial effort of “measurement of sci-
ence emerged out of the interest in great men, heredity and eugenics and the contri-
bution of great men to civilization” (Godin, 2008, p. 8). Few decades later, the psy-
chologist James M. Cattell compiled and published a large collection of biographical
and statistical information about scientists in the United States (cf. Cattell, 1905),
known as the American men of science. It is important to notice that those surveys were
conducted by isolated scientists who above all intended “to contribute to the advance-
ment of science and of the scientific profession” (Godin, 2008, p.8). Cattell, in par-
ticular, was politically engaged and used to make severe critics to Columbia University
governance – where he worked from 1891 until being fired in 1917 – which, according
to him, had limited academic freedom. He actually used the data from the second edi-
tion of the American men of science as evidence to argue that universities that adopted
democratic methods of appointments and promotions employed a larger number of
eminent scientists (cf. Sokal, 2009). By the way, it is noteworthy that a statistical rank-
ing had been part of an argument in favor of academic freedom.
After 1920’s onwards, statistical surveys on science were no longer made by iso-
lated scientists but became supported by governmental agencies and international or-
ganizations. Ever since, investments in scientific research, technological innovation,
patents and expenditures in higher education for improving scientific and technical
skills began to be widely employed as indicators of economic development. Thus,
around the end of the World War II, economic and geopolitical concerns replaced that
somewhat romantic motivation of Galton and Cattell.1 In the United States, the Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) begun to collect and publish research and
development (R&D) statistical series, and other countries organized their own data-
bases. At that time, however, there was no unified methodology able to provide reliable
comparisons between countries. This problem motivated the formulation of a stand-
ard methodology for collecting statistics on R&D, and resulted in the Frascati manual
published in 1963 by the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development
1 One of the first philosophers concerned with the economic constraints of the scientific activities was the pragma-
tist Charles S. Peirce. In 1879, Peirce wrote his “Note on the theory of the economy of research” where he proposed
a cost-benefit analysis of scientific inquiries. According to Wible (1994, p. 135): “The Note presents an economic
model of research project selection in science (...) The Note is also significant for making economic factors a central
part of a theory of scientific inference, something which contemporary economic methodologists and philosophers
still have not done except for a few notable exceptions”. For a detailed examination Peirce´s achievements in such
context, see also Rescher (1976).
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(cf. OECD, 2002). Christopher Freeman, distinguished English economist, founder
and first director of Science and Technology Policy Research Unit at the University of
Sussex, prepared the first edition of the Frascati manual. According to Godin:
Christopher Freeman was the ideal person to work on such a manual because he
was one of the few people at that time with hands-on experience of designing and
analyzing a survey of R&D (…) E. Rudd, from the British Department of Scien-
tific and Industrial Research (DSIR), suggested to the OECD that Freeman be
invited as consultant to work on what would become the Frascati Manual (…) In
the following decades, the manual served as the basis for surveying R&D in mem-
ber countries, for collecting international data at OECD, and for analyzing trends
in science. The manual also gave official statisticians their main indicator on sci-
ence: Gross Expenditures on R&D, or GERD – the sum of expenditures devoted
to R&D [by universities, government, industry and non-profit organizations]
(Godin, 2007b, p. 1394).
Ever since OECD has adopted a standard cost-benefit accounting, usually called
“input-output model” (cf. Freeman 1962, 1967; Leontief, 1936). Here I do not intend
to discuss this model and its limitations, but only to highlight that is an application of
traditional econometric statistics on the specific domain of R&D.
The specific term “scientometrics” was originally coined by the Russian math-
ematician V. V. Nalimov, consisting in the English translation of the title of Nalimov’s
monograph “Naukometriya” published in 1969 (cf. Garfield, 2007). Nevertheless, the
history of scientometrics includes earlier contributions from Alfred Lotka (1926),
Samuel C. Bradford (1934), John Desmond Bernal (1939), George K. Zipf (1949), and
the dominant figure of Derek de Solla Price.2 Thus, official (governmental) R&D stat-
isticians and economists were not the only protagonists in the history scientometrics,
since this discipline has also encompassed others investigation trends.
From the point of view of its adherents, we usually find out the claim that the
discipline was chiefly motivated by two main ideas. First, that making a “science of
science” would eventually inform better science policies; second, that only a quantita-
2 A survey on the most cited papers in the history of scientometrics, made by Garfield (2007), includes in the first
ten places: 1) Little science, big science (Price, 1963); 2) Networks of scientific papers (Price, 1965a); 3) Science
since Babylon (Price, 1961); 4) Scientific community (Hagstrom, 1965); 5) The frequency distribution of scientific
productivity (Lotka, 1926); 6) Collaboration in an invisible college (Price & Beaver, 1966); 7) The structure of scien-
tific revolution (Kuhn, 1962); 8) The Matthew effect in science (Merton, 1968); 9) Is technology historically inde-
pendent of science? A study in statistical historiography (Price, 1965b) and 10) Visibility and the structural bases of
awareness of scientific research (Cole & Cole, 1967).
150
Renato Rodrigues Kinouchi
scientiæ zudia, São Paulo, v. 12, special issue, p. 147-59, 2014
tive approach to the subject would be able to produce objective knowledge about it (cf.
Merton & Garfield, 1986; Wouters & Leidersdorff, 1994). The so-called fathers of
scientometrics are often presented as devoted pursuers of those two ideals, and due to
its form, its content, and the number of citations received — a bibliometric criteria par
excellence, however controversial – Price’s book Little science, big science has been
elected the most important work in the history of scientometrics. In the re-edition of
this famed book, Merton and Garfield acknowledged Price’s theoretical influence on
quantitative studies of science and emphasized the policy issues raised by him:
For in elucidating the social and cognitive arithmetic of science, this book did
much to lay the foundations of the field of inquiry given over to the quantitative
analysis of science and scientific development – the field that has come to be
known as scientometrics, or, at times, bibliometrics. (…) Fired by Price’s ample
numerical imagination, this book is dedicated to establishing and interpreting
the magnitudes of growth in “the size of science”: in the numbers of scientists
and scientific publications and in the societal resources allocated to the pursuit
of science and science-based technology. But, as is emphatically asserted, it is
not so much the sheer exponential growth in the size of science – an estimated
five orders of magnitude in three centuries – as the logistic character of that growth
that calls for special notice. It is argued that the inevitable saturation of science
will require freshly formulated science policy: “new and exciting tactics for sci-
ence” (Merton & Garfield, 1987, p. 73-4).
It is noteworthy that the most emphatic appraisals to Price’s works came from
adherents of functionalist schools of social sciences, in particular Merton and his fol-
lowers whose social model of science depends on the notion that it works as a complex
rewarding system. Price and Merton clearly converged in at least two specific points:
“the fact that it is excluded, for a practitioner of scientometrics, the possibility to dis-
cuss the content of science (…) and the postulate according to which science is reduc-
ible to an autonomous entity that can be studied objectively” (cf. Shinn & Ragouet,
2008, p. 43). Nevertheless, most affinities between Mertonian functionalists and
scientometricians have concerned, above all, their belief that citation analysis could
explicit the mechanisms of social recognition in the scientific community. For instance,
Eugene Garfield, the founder of the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI), usually
claimed that “a lot of people are passed over in the informal reward system of science…
citation analysis became for me a vehicle to transform an informal system of recogni-
tion into an explicit reward system for science” (Cawkell & Garfield, 2001, p. 150).
This claim, by the way, echoes Cattell’s earlier criticism to American universities’ ad-
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ministration, whose salaries and promotions policies were hardly informed by objec-
tive criteria (cf. Cattell, 1913).
In the meantime, one could wonder whether those high expectations were actu-
ally met or not. As matter of fact, no one can deny that in the last three decades the
extraordinary amount of quantitative measurements has influenced science policies
around the world. However, what about the alleged scientific character of such en-
terprise? “Price’s dream” (Wouters & Leydersdorff, 1994) was that scientometrics
would eventually overcome the supposed limitations of qualitative approaches. Did it
come true?
Price used to describe “the development of scientometrics as the emergence of a
“relatively hard” social science” (Wouters & Leydersdorff, 1994, p. 194). According to
Price’s (1970) analysis of 162 journals, the literature in the research fronts of science –
particularly in physics and biochemistry – exhibits an “immediacy effect” due to their
fast and vigorous development. In order to show this immediacy effect, Price com-
pared different areas proportion of citations in the last five years – a measure known as
Price’s Index. For him, the fundamental difference between “hard” disciplines and “soft”
ones is that the former exhibits a short-temporal pattern of citation frequency (thus a
higher Price’s Index) while the latter does not.
In summary, the signature of research fronts would consist in some type of “cita-
tions freshness”, which could be detected by Price’s Index. Wouters and Leydersdorff
(1994) applied this criterion to examine whether scientometric studies actually ex-
hibits high immediacy effect, but the results showed a citation temporal-pattern not
significantly different from traditional social studies on science. Therefore, although
scientometric studies make intensive use of descriptive statistics, they are far from
being that hard science envisioned by Price. Looking retrospectively, the promise of a
science of science sounds as a beautiful narrative starring remarkable protagonists en-
gaged in a somewhat promethean adventure. However, one may wonder whether it does
not sound a too well adjusted narrative.
2 Formalism and interpretations: the case of the impact factor
Practitioners of scientometrics usually claim that their quantitative methods provide
greater objectivity in comparison with other qualitative approaches to scientific prac-
tices. Despite the controversial character of such a claim – which I will discuss further
– it is important to remember that all disciplines that have been satisfactorily
mathematized always contain two distinct basic components: a formalism, defining
the operations that can be realized with the available data, and an interpretation of
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their meaning. As matter of illustration, let us examine the measure known as arith-
metic mean. This is a purely formal operation used to estimate the central tendency of a
collection of numbers, and defined as the sum of the numbers divided by the size of the
collection. So, if we wish to know the average weight of a given population (for instance,
the students of a college), we sum the weight of each person and divide by the total
number of persons. By the way, a medical researcher could interpret this average weight
as a health “indicator” regarding the eating habits of the students. Now, in case we wish
to know the average number of cigarettes smoked per day by the same population, the
arithmetic mean would not be interpreted as a useful “indicator” because the sub-
populations of smokers and non-smokers differ absolutely in regard to the habit of
smoking. The mathematical formula would be the same, but the first interpretation
sounds reliable, while the second does not.
In the field of scientometrics, we use the arithmetic mean to calculate the so-
called impact factor of scientific journals. In this case, the formula consists in the number
of citations of a journal during a period of three years divided by the number of citable
articles published by the journal in the same period. The meaning attributed to such
metrics, however, depends on the interpretation about the components of the formula.
Firstly, we have to accept the assumption that the number of citations somehow repre-
sents a measure of the quality of the papers published by journals. This keystone as-
sumption – that scientists’ citing behavior is correlative to a definite value attributed
to cited works – is very controversial because “not enough is known about the ‘citation
behavior’ of authors - why the author makes citations, why he makes his particular
citations, and how they reflect or do not reflect his actual research and use of the lit-
erature” (Smith, 1981 apud Wouters, 1998, p. 230). Secondly, why choosing a period of
three years, rather than four or five? Is it purely arbitrary choice? Indeed, it comes
from Solla Price’s immediacy index. The choice of three years instead of five can be
seen as arbitrary; however, it preserves the original idea that innovative scientific ar-
eas have short-temporal citation pattern.
Even if we disregard the questions above, there is much criticism to the adequacy
of impact factor because this “refers to the average number of citations per paper, but
this is not a normal distribution. It is rather a Bradford distribution3 (…) Being an
arithmetic mean, the impact factor therefore is not a valid representation of this dis-
tribution and unfit for citation evaluation” (Tamilselven & Balasubramanian, 2012,
p. 11). For example, the editors of Nature “have analyzed the citations of individual
3 The Bradford distribution (or Bradford´s Law) is a negative exponential distribution described by Samuel Brad-
ford, in 1934, according to which there are a few very productive journals, a larger number of moderate producers,
and a still larger number of constantly diminishing productivity.
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papers in Nature and found that 89% of last year’s figure [of citations] was generated
by just 25% of our papers” (Nature, 2005, p. 1003-4). This result definitely shows that
arithmetic mean is not a reliable indicator since a small portion of cited papers in-
duces most part of citations (compare it with the “average number of cigarettes” exam-
ple discussed above).
Finally, there is a strong semantic bias in the term impact factor. Its correct name
should be “average citation in the last three years” but this unpretentious name prob-
ably would be neither seductive, nor merchantable. Indeed, impact factor is a fantasy
name for an ISI product, published in the Journal of Citation Report. I do not intend to
discuss this marketing strategy, but let me highlight one important detail. We call some-
thing a “factor” as it works as a “cause” or “input” that influences something else. How-
ever, the number of citations is not a cause but an “effect” or “output” resulted from
the credits attributed by other authors. There is an inversion operating here because
to publish in journals that exhibits high impact factors seems to be a warranty of being
read and cited. As noticed above, however, just a minority of papers are highly cited.
3 Economic interpretations of scientometrics
Scientometric reports (e.g. UNESCO, 2010; OECD, 2011) usually appear as a kind of
accounting of science based on the supposition that we can evaluate scientific develop-
ment like the increased production of a commodity (cf. Raan, 1997; Gibbons & Wittrock,
1985). In a general sense, a commodity is any marketable item; but in a narrower sense,
it is a marketable item that exhibits fungibility, i.e., the property of a good or service
whose individual units permit mutual substitution. Units of goods like soybeans are
evaluated by the markets as equivalents and, in accordance, if we want to compare the
production of such a commodity by distinct producers, it is enough to compare the
number of units produced. However, there are marketable goods that are not fungible:
diamonds, for instance, are not fungible because their varying colors, sizes, carats and
cuts make difficult to establish any standard value, so it is not reasonable to exchange
equal quantities of diamonds because their values can vary dramatically.
Now, by analogy, as we make bibliometric comparisons, are we comparing dia-
monds or soybeans? According to our analysis, if we compare, for instance, the raw
number of publications of the producer A with the raw number of publications of the
producer B, we are assuming that a publication is a fungible commodity. In the same
line, academic rankings that evaluate academic productivity by comparing raw num-
bers of publications are making such economic interpretation of the data. Neverthe-
less, it is manifest that such comparisons do not sound adequate if we consider that
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scientific works are not fungible. Let us examine another analogy: Joseph Haydn had
one hundred and six symphonies published, while Beethoven had nine; is there any
sense in saying that Haydn was more productive than Beethoven? It is a good analogy
because sheet music is published material likewise scientific papers. In case we inter-
pret “published symphonies” as fungible commodities, the answer is yes; but if we con-
sider that musical works are not fungible commodities, that question is nonsensical.
In order to avoid the question above, scientometricians have proposed citation
data provided by ISI as the best way of estimating the value of publications, under the
controversial assumption that the number of citations is a reliable, objective indicator
of scientific works’ quality (cf. Leydesdorff, 1998; Wesel et al., 2013; Wouters, 1998).
One might argue that the presumed objectivity is indeed a value judgment held by man-
agers of scientific institutions and Mertonian sociologists of science without a reliable
“theory of citation” that could explain and predict citing behavior. This assumption, in
addition, cannot itself be supported on the basis of exclusively quantitative evidence,
for it could only be tested in the light of quantitative data if there were an independent
criterion of quality. Nevertheless, the development of citations indexes demands this
assumption because:
The basic function of the Science Citation Index (and similar devices) is to turn
an enormous amount of lists of references upside down. Instead of organizing
these references according to the articles they belong to, they are organized ac-
cording to the articles they point at (…) This rather innocently looking inversion
has important consequences. By creating a different typographical format of the
lists of references - by organizing the references not according to the texts they
belong to, but according to the texts they point at, they become attributes of the
cited instead of the original, citing, texts (Wouters, 1998, p. 232-3).
By considering citation as an attribute of the cited texts, instead of the original
citing ones, citation indexes reify the notion that scientific publications have some
sort of value that could be quantitatively measured. Alternatively, one might say that
ISI has created a type official accounting of scientific capital – as to use Bourdieu´s
(1976) terminology. Not finding a better expression for it rather than an analogy, I say
a paper seems to be a “deposit” made by a producer, and citations appear as “interests”
paid by other producers, so that the total symbolic capital of a given producer is the
sum of the number of published papers plus the number of citations received.
Not only can the citation frequency of a certain article be measured, this fre-
quency can also be summed at higher levels of aggregation to obtain the citation
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frequencies of institutions, journals, countries and even of disciplines and schol-
arly fields as a whole. Much of descriptive scientometrics is based on this. Con-
sequently, the citation seems to have a universal quality. Since the citation fre-
quency of every article can be measured — if a publication is not cited it still has a
citation frequency: with a value of zero — every article can be compared with any
other (…) The role of the citation might also be compared with that of money,
especially if we take the evaluative use of scientometrics into account. When the
value of an article is expressed in its citation frequency, the citation is the unit of
currency of science by which every article can be compared with any other, no
matter what the subject or field is (Wouters, 1998, p. 235-6).
Citation analysis avoids the question about the non-fungibility of scientific works
by taking the number of citations as a measure for comparing their values – which means
that papers are considered partially fungible. Nevertheless, citation analysis interprets
citations themselves as fungible because “all citations are equal” (Smith, 1991 apud
Wouters, 1998, p. 235), a very controversial assumption that has motivated the quest
for a citation theory (cf. Leydersdorff, 1998). Here I wish to stress as “the role of the
citation might also be compared with that of money (…) the unit of currency of sci-
ence” (Wouters, 1998, p.235). Incidentally, in a critical discussion on the role played
by ISI in the last decades, Adam (2002) have called it “the undisputed king of the count-
ing house of contemporary science” (p. 728).
4 The counting house
By taking advantage of the remarkable development of information technologies in
1960s and 1970s – which provided means for application bibliometric tools in a scale
hardly imaginable few decades before – Garfield found out the Ariadne’s thread of the
living labyrinth of scientific literature: citation analysis. Additionally, Garfield suc-
ceeded in establishing one of the most successful companies of the informational
economy (Beira, 2010). Garfield begun his career as a chemist, but very early became
interested in library science. Nevertheless, his most impressive personal trait was
to be an entrepreneur with a strong business acumen (cf. Cawkell & Garfield, 2001,
p. 154-5). He founded his first company in 1955, named Eugene Garfield Associates
Inc. However, “the name Eugene Garfield Associates Inc., was changed to The Insti-
tute for Scientific Information in 1960. The reason for the adoption of this name was
to create a more equal ground in competing with non-profit organizations” (Cawkell &
Garfield, 2001, p. 153). This business strategy of changing the name of the company
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intending to sound “non-profit” has been very successful and even today most people
seldom realize that ISI is not a non-profit organization.
The main ISI’s product – the Science Citation Index (SCI) – was launched in 1963,
and it is important to emphasize that SCI was intended to be much more than a mere
academic database; indeed, it was the development of Garfield’s ideas into a product
economically viable. According to Cawkell and Garfield (2001, p. 156): “the SCI data-
base represents the company’s most valuable asset because of the many ways its data
can be processed to form a new product”. In 1992, the Thomson Reuters acquired the
ISI, by approximate 210 million USD (cf. Beira 2010), and thenceforth controls the
largest database on publications in almost all areas of knowledge. It is important to
notice, by the way, that citation analysis depends on massive databases covering large
number of publications. Nowadays the global market of Science, Technical and Medi-
cal (STM) publishing is composed by “companies such as Elsevier, Wiley, Springer,
and Taylor & Francis (…) These companies hold more than 50% of the global market
of STM publishing, which is estimated as between 7 and 11 billion dollars” (Hengl, Gould
& Gerritsma, 2012, p. 43). The incorporation of ISI by Thomson Reuters means that
the same company both publish scientific works and account their eventual recogni-
tion. In fact, the expansion of bibliometric studies have been connected with STM glo-
bal publishers’ interests, and it is not surprising that those companies now control the
most important databases required for citation analysis.4
Conclusion
The rising of scientometrics happened during the post- and cold war, so we cannot
disregard all the constellation of extra-scientific interests of that milieu. In fact, gov-
ernments and international organizations like OECD supported the first official sci-
entometric studies on R&D, following the guidelines proposed by econometricians like
Cristopher Freeman. Not long after, the extraordinary development of information
technologies provided the ground for private enterprises like the Institute of Scien-
tific Information (ISI), headed by Eugene Garfield. Despite of this industry-like side
of scientometrics, it is also true that distinguished scientists, such as Price and Merton,
used to furnish some type of theoretical justification for scientometrics by emphasiz-
ing the supposed advantages of quantitative methodologies. In the end, geopolitical,
economic and scientific concerns have converged into an amalgam of interests mutu-
4 For instance, the Web of Science is maintained by ISI-Thomson Reuters, Elsevier maintains the Scopus, and the
Crossref is a non-profit organization that receives support and approval from Wiley and Springer.
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ally reinforcing, and have laid the ground for a scientifically-justified – in the mind of its
adherents – global industry of measurements.
To conclude, I wish to rejoin two related small questions. First, is it useful to
collect statistical data and to analyze them using a mathematical formalism? In my opin-
ion, yes, it is, because statistical data could inform science policies. I am not saying
here that scientometric studies are actually informing better science policies. Most of
scientometrics reports are productivist, that is, positive evaluations are assigned to
scientific fields according to the increased quantity produced, resulting in some type
of “taylorization” of research activities (cf. Oliveira, 2008). However, there is no im-
pediment to make valuable diagnosis about scientific practices based on the scarcity of
productions. For instance, the scarcity of papers and books on certain subject –
e.g. agro-ecology and other alternative agricultural practices, such as Lacey’s (2008,
2010) investigations on the controversy of transgenic seeds – could be interpreted as
indicator for more investment in the field, in particular due to the social values em-
bodied by such scarce researches. Second, should scientometric research be so much
dependent on the database owned by a single company? The answer is no, because al-
though ISI’s business strategy may be legitimate, the existence of alternative databases
(private and public) eventually enlarges the repository of available data. Thus the rem-
edy against business-oriented biases in scientometrics is a more democratic sciento-
metrics, otherwise scientific information will continue being controlled by half-dozen
global corporations.
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